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Neglected Dimensions of Global Security
The Global Health Risk Framework Commission
The world has experienced global health crises rang-
ing fromnovel influenzas (H5N1 andH1N1) and corona-
viruses (SARS andMERS) to the Ebola and Zika viruses.
In each case, governments and international organiza-
tions seemed unable to react quickly and decisively.
Health crises have unmasked critical vulnerabilities—
weak health systems, failures of leadership, and politi-
cal overreaction and underreaction. The Global Health
Risk Framework Commission, for which the National
Academy of Medicine served as the secretariat, re-
cently set out a comprehensive strategy to safeguard
human and economic security from pandemic threats
(eTable in the Supplement).1
The Business Case for Health Security
The international communityhas significantly underes-
timated the risk that pandemics pose to human life and
livelihood.TheHIV/AIDSpandemichaskilledmore than
35million people since the late 1960s.2 Even relatively
low-mortality eventshave substantial economic conse-
quences. During the Ebola epidemic, the 3 most af-
fectedWestAfricancountriesexperiencedaggregatecu-
mulative gross domestic product losses of more than
10%,3 while the economic cost of SARS was estimated
at more than $40 billion.4 The commission’s modeling
suggests21st-centurypandemics couldcost inexcessof
$6trillion,withanannualizedexpected lossofmorethan
$60 billion.1 The scale of human and economic harm
from pandemics compares with war, terrorism, and fi-
nancial crises, yet funding dedicated to pandemic
preparedness is of an entirely different magnitude.
The commissionproposed an incremental $4.5 bil-
lion per year for spending on health systems, emer-
gency response, and research. This investment should
yield significant benefits, protecting the public from in-
fectious diseases and related risks such as antimicro-
bial resistance and bioterrorism. By spending just 65
cents per person per annum, theworldwould gain a far
greater dividend in human and economic security. The
secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) should
commissiona triannual reviewtoensureeffective imple-
mentation. National governments and multilateral fi-
nancing agencies, among others, should fully fund the
preparedness agenda set out by the commission.
National Health Systems
National health systems are the foundation of a global
health risk framework. The International Health Regula-
tions isan international treatythatrequires196countries,
orStatesParties, tobuildandmaintaincorehealthsystem
capacitiestodetect,assess,report,andrespondto“poten-
tial public health emergencies of international concern.”5
Currently,StatesPartiesperformself-assessmentsoftheir
corecapacities,butonly64ofthecountrieshaveaffirmed
meeting core capacities.6 Self-assessments, moreover,
are inherently unreliable and cannot ensure uniformly
high-quality national preparedness.
The World Health Organization (WHO) should re-
quire States Parties to undergo independent and trans-
parentassessments,withanannual report submitted to
the World Health Assembly. Peer reviewers would use
objective standards to assess capacities and perfor-
mance. Governments would be required to create na-
tional plans to achieve public health core capacities
fundedthroughdomesticbudgets,with internationalas-
sistance to fill any capacity gaps. The World Bank and
otherdonorsshouldcondition financial assistancebased
on a country’s agreement to participate in external
assessments.
Resilient health systems must have well-trained
health workers and community participation to build
public trust and provide culturally appropriate ser-
vices.Health systemsshould incorporatea “OneHealth”
strategy because most diseases in humans are spread
fromanimals.AOneHealth strategy recognizes that the
health of humans is connected to the health of animals
and the environment and integrates veterinary and ag-
ricultural perspectives. If robust health systems were
seen as vital to national security, it would strengthen
political will andmobilize resources.
International Leadership and Governance
While a national health system is the foundation of se-
curity, international leadership is at theapexbecause in-
fectiousdiseases rapidly transcendborders.Aglobal re-
sponsealso transcends thehealth sector, encompassing
transportation, commerce, trade, and the environ-
ment. Global coordination across diverse sectors re-
quiresmanaging logistics, deployingmedical teamsand
equipment, and mobilizing humanitarian assistance.
Preparedness against infectious diseases is a global
public good—deficiencies in one country endanger
all of humanity. That is why international norms and
well-functioning institutions are essential.
Yet Ebola revealed major deficiencies in gover-
nance,particularlyatWHO.7WHOmust improve its abil-
ity to coordinate with other UN agencies, regional net-
works, andnonstateactors. Throughvarious incentives,
these parties should hold countries publicly account-
able for timely reportingof outbreaksofpotential inter-
national importance. Multilateral finance agencies (eg,
WorldBank, InternationalMonetary Fund, and regional
development banks) should raise and disperse finan-
cial resources for pandemic preparedness and re-
sponse. Access to favorable investment terms could be
influenced by country preparedness.
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Awell-equippedWHOCenter forHealthEmergencyPrepared-
ness andResponse (CHEPR)wouldbe themost importantWHOor-
ganizational reform—operating scientifically and apolitically. The
CHEPRwouldhave itsownexecutivedirector (at thedeputydirector-
general level) and would report directly to an independent techni-
cal governing board. The center would oversee all WHO emer-
gencypreparednessand response functions including International
Health Regulations implementation. It would create a daily high-
prioritywatch list ofdiseaseswithpotential tobecomepublichealth
emergenciesof international concern.A5%($50millionover2016-
2017) increase in core contributions of the member states would
cover the center’s incremental startup costs as well as a sustain-
able $100 million contingency fund for WHO operations and
emergency surge response.
The center’s routine operationswould remainwithin theWHO
Secretariat. However, if a crisis escalates to a high-level interna-
tional threat or broader humanitarian disaster, the technical gov-
erning board would report to the UN secretary-general to lead an
integrated, multiagency response. The transition to the UN would
generate political and financial commitment, triggering intensified
UN agency action.
Accelerating Research and Development
Emerging and resurgent infectious diseases demand rapid devel-
opment of fit-for-purpose tools and technologies, such as vac-
cines,drugs,diagnostics,personalprotectiveequipment, andmedi-
cal devices. TheEbola epidemic highlighted important deficiencies
in the deployment of medical products. An effective research and
development (R&D) strategy would include an international coor-
dinating entity; sustainable investments; convergence of diverse
regulatory pathways; and access to intellectual property, data, and
biological samples—ensuring rigorous scientific standards. Success
requires community engagement and anthropological input to
promote swift adoption of new technologies.
TheR&Dcommunity—academia,government, industry,andcivil
society—must be galvanized into a cohesive group to determine
swiftly the biomedical interventions needed to respond to a pan-
demic, identifying key gaps that require collective ingenuity and
funding. In interpandemic phases,when there is no pressing emer-
gency, the R&D community must develop knowledge and have
products ready for advanced development.
To carry out these functions, WHO should establish a high-
level expert panel that is independent from WHO and reports to
the technical governing board. The Pandemic Product Develop-
ment Committee would be composed of 15 members with world-
class expertise in discovery, development, regulatory approval,
andmedical product manufacturing. The committee would set pri-
orities for R&D on high-risk pathogens, mobilize resources, coordi-
nate public/private actors, reduce redundancies and cost, and
create a strategic R&D.
AcceleratedR&Drequires significantnew financing,with a rec-
ommended incremental spend from governmental health and de-
fense and private sources of $1 billion per year for at least 15 years.
Used synergistically with existing and new public and private ex-
penditures, these funds would build and sustain R&D prepared-
ness. The $1 billion figure can be comparedwith the scale of a small
tomedium pharmaceutical company’s R&D activities working on a
portfolio of promising drugs and vaccines for key target diseases.
With this relatively modest investment, early research on Pan-
demicProductDevelopmentCommittee–prioritizedpathogensand
platformswouldbecompletedbeforeacrisisarises,making itbepos-
sible to move products more quickly to clinical testing, regulatory
approval, production, and deployment.
There is no question that the world will face pandemics in the
future; theonlyquestion is the levelofnational andglobalprepared-
nessand response.Thecommission recommendsabold,3-pronged
framework: reinforcingnational publichealth capabilities, strength-
eningWHOand theUN system, and accelerating R&D. The scale of
these reforms and the $4.5 billion incremental financing proposed
by thecommission isnot trivial, butneither is it beyond reach. In the
contextofestimatedexpectedeconomicannualized lossesfrompan-
demics ofmore than $60 billion, it is a very good investment. Con-
sidering the threat tohuman lives, thenormative andbusiness case
is compelling.
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